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I.

INTRODUCTION

Appellees attempt to cloud this appeal with sophistry, misrepresentation, and
misapplication - but fail to rebut Archer. Appellees confuse rather than correct Archer's
straightforward application of the law. This Court should ignore Appellees' strategy to
dodge the legal standards under which the district court's ruling should be reversed.
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

The final written order is the appealable order - oral statements made from
the bench are not the judgment of the court for purposes of appeal.
Appellees spend much of their brief - not on the merits - but on the erroneous

premise that Archer's appeal is moot because he has not appealed every aspect of the oral
statements made from the bench (as interpreted by Appellees) and defendants' motion for
summary judgment.1 Contrary to Appellees' premise, oral statements made from the
bench:
• are not the judgment of the court;
• are not appealable;J and
• are superseded by the formal written order.4
Here, the formal written order is the December 11, 2008 amended order granting
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the following grounds:

1

Appellees' Brief} pp. 5-6; 10-12; 13-19.
State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978); Newton v. State Road Commission,
463 P.2d 565, 567 (Utah 1970); citing McCollum v. Clothier, 241 P.2d 468, 472 (Utah
1952) ("Oral statements of opinion by the trial court inconsistent with the findings and
conclusions ultimately rendered do not affect the final judgment.") (Emphasis added).
3
Id
"Id
2

l

1. Neither Armadillo nor Union Pacific owed Plaintiff a duty to provide
transportation equipped with rear seat head restraints.
2. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration does not impose a
duty on vehicle manufacturers to install rear seat head restraints and
specifically considered and rejected imposing such a duty upon
manufacturers.
Imposing such a duty upon consumers such as
Armadillo or Union Pacific would be inconsistent with the NHTSA
manufacturing requirements, particularly in light of the absence of
specialized knowledge of head restraints on the part of defendants in
this case. Plaintiffs claims against Armadillo and Union Pacific based
upon failure of Armadillo and Union Pacific to provide transportation
with rear seat head restraints are therefore barred by the doctrine of
conflict preemption.
3. Even if Armadillo and/or Union Pacific owed Plaintiff a duty, and
Plaintiffs claims were not barred by the doctrine of conflict preemption,
Plaintiff is unable to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
Plaintiff would not have suffered his injuries if there had been rear seat
head restraints installed in the subject van. Indeed, Plaintiffs experts
are unable to offer any opinions as to whether the existence of a rear
seat head restraint would have prevented the Plaintiffs injuries.
4. There are no disputed material facts demonstrating any negligence on
behalf of Armadillo's driver, Casey Sorensen.5
Neither the motion nor the oral statements made from the bench are appealable as
the judgment of the court. The appealable order is the December 11, 2008 amended
order - the order appealed by Archer - superseding any oral statements made from the
bench. Appellees filed no counter-appeal to enlarge the focus of this appeal beyond the
December 11, 2008 amended order.
Appellees try to squeeze implications out of the district court's oral statements to
reach the improper conclusion that Archer has not appealed the issues of foreseeability,

5

R 1605-1609; See, Amended Order Granting Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment, Appellant Brief Addendum No. 10.
2

causation, and the exclusion of the doctors' affidavits.6

Appellees' implications fail

because Archer has addressed these issues on appeal:
•

Causation and the doctors' expertise are addressed in Appellant's brief- Issue "D"
- whether orthopedic and spine surgeons have the medical expertise to render
medical causation opinions regarding the injuries caused by the failure to provide
rear seat head restraints in the vehicle transporting Appellant which was involved
in a rear end collision.7

•

Foreseeability is an element of the railroad's duty of care. Appellees' duty is
addressed in Issues "A" and "B" of Appellant's brief- whether Appellees owed a
duty to Archer to provide transportation equipped with rear seat head restraints;
and whether a rear seat head restraint is a safety device which, like other safety
devises, is needed for a reasonably safe workplace.9
Archer has properly appealed the district court's summary judgment order, which

the order on appeal.
B.

Archer has not waived anything - he may answer new issues set forth in the
opposing brief.
Appellees cite State v. Reyes10 and Anderson v. Wright11 for the improper assertion

that Archer has waived his right to address the issues of foreseeability, causation, and the
exclusion of the doctors' affidavits on appeal. Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure states that reply briefs may address any new matter set forth in the opposing
brief.

Archer may therefore properly respond to these issues here.

6

Appellees' Brief, pp. 10-11 and 13.
Appellant's Brief, p. 9.
8
Handy v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 841 P.2d 1210, 1218 and 1219 (Utah App. 1992); citing
Mitchell v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 786 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1990).
9
Appellant's Brief, p. 8.
10
40 P.3d 630 (Utah 2002).
" 273 P.2d 418 (Utah 1954).
12
Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
7

3

Reyes was a criminal case in which the defendant was charged with rape and
sodomy of a child.13 The defendant filed a pro se motion and the trial court denied the
motion.14 On appeal before the Utah Supreme Court, the defendant failed to even address
the court's denial of the motion in his brief, or at oral argument, and therefore waived
those arguments.15 Unlike Reyes, Archer has fully addressed the district court's order on
appeal.
In Anderson, the plaintiffs were precluded from introducing evidence of fraud on
appeal because they failed to plead fraud, did not amend their pleadings to show fraud,
and showed no intention of changing the theory of their case to fraud.16

Unlike

Anderson, Appellant has not failed to plead any theory at issue on appeal.
C.

Regardless of the lack of prior complaints, UP has a duty to inspect, discover,
and protect its employees and could have reasonably foreseen that
transporting Archer without a head restraint could result in injury.
Appellees argue that UP has no duty to Archer in this case because there were no
11

prior complaints that the absence of rear seat head restraints was a hazardous condition.
Appellees' argument fails for three reasons:
• It is UP's duty (not Archer's) to inspect, discover, and protect its employees from
hazards in the workplace.
•

The prior-complaint standard applies to claims involving an emotionally unsafe
workplace and does not apply here.19

"Reyes, 40?.3d at 361.
Id.
"Id.
16
Anderson, 273 P.2d at 340.
11
Appellees' Brief at pp. 27-28.
18
Cazadv, Chesapeake & Ohio Ry Co., 622 F.2d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1980); Williams v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 190 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1951).
u

4

Appellees blindly assert - without citation to the record - that there were no prior
20
complaints.
Appellees cite Adams v. CSX Transp., for the improper proposition that UP has
no duty without prior complaints.22 Adams involved a claim for emotional injury under
the FELA, and as articulated by Adams, this distinction is critical - the prior-complaints
standard applies only to claims based on allegations of an emotionally unsafe workplace
and does not define the threshold of actionable conduct for a physically unsafe
workplace.

The instant case is about a physically unsafe workplace - the Adams prior-

complaint standard does not apply.
UP has a duty of reasonable care to make inspections, and to discover and protect
its employees from hazards in the workplace.24 UP breaches its duty to provide a safe
workplace when it knows or should know of potential hazards in the workplace, yet fails
to exercise reasonable care to inform and protect its employees.

Actual notice of an

unsafe condition is unnecessary to show foreseeability under FELA.
Here, UP could have reasonably foreseen that transporting Archer without a head
restraint could result in injury:

19

Adams v. CSX Transp., Inc., 899 F.2d 536, 540 (6th Cir. 1990).
20
Appellees Brief, p. 31.
21
899 F.2d 536, 540 (6th Cir. 1990).
22
Appellees Brief, pp. 27-28.
23
Adams, 899 F.2d at 540. (Emphasis added).
24
Cazad, 622 F.2d at 75; Williams, 190 F.2d at 748.
25
Gallose v. Long Island R. Co., 878 F.2d 80, 84-85 (2nd Cir. 1989).
26
Williams v. NationalR.R. Passenger Corp., 161 F.3d 1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1998);
quoting Nivens v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 425 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1970).
5

•

UP admits that it was responsible for identifying and reducing the risk of
reasonably foreseeable hazards in the workplace.27

•

UP admits that rear-end collisions were reasonably foreseeable hazards in the
TO

workplace.
•

Before Archer's injury, UP knew that seat head restraints were important safety
devices that reduced the risk of neck injuries in rear-end collisions.29
Appellees argue that UP had no duty because there is no evidence in the record

that other railroads took action to ensure that their employees were provided rear seat
head restraints.30 Appellees ignore that UP itself had taken steps to provide headrests to
their transported employees. UP transported crew members in vehicles with rear seat
1 1

head restraints prior to the 2004 incident

and other UP locations restricted employees

from using center seats, which did not have rear seat head restraints.
D.

in

Issue "B" goes to the district court's ruling on UP's duty and is properly
presented on appeal.
Appellees assert, in footnote, that Archer may not present Issue "B" on appeal -

whether a rear seat head restraint is a safety device which, like other safety devises, is
needed for a reasonably safe workplace."

This issue goes directly to UP's non-

delegable duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace and whether this duty extends to
Armadillo's van, including rear seat head restraints or lack thereof.34

27

R. 893.
*Id.
29
Id.
30
Appellees' Brief, p. 27.
31
R. 893-94.
n
R. 893-94.
33
Appellees' Brief, p. 24.
34
Appellant's Brief, pp. 36-39.
2

6

E.

Wier is directly on point - whether UP should have listed rear seat head
restraints as a mandatory safety feature in its agreement with Armadillo is a
material issue of fact sufficient to defeat UP's motion for summary judgment
Appellees make several unsuccessful attempts to keep this Court from considering

Wier}5 Appellees blindly assert - without citation - that Archer cannot cite Wier on
appeal because it was not cited in his brief before the district court.36 Parties may cite to
new and different authority on appeal - if not, there would be no reason to submit briefs
on appeal - parties would simply rely on their district court briefing.
Appellees assert that this Court is not bound by Wier because state courts are not
TO

bound by federal district court decisions on issues of federal law.

Contrary to

Appellees' argument - for over 90 years courts have held that all questions of law under
FELA - including those in state court - are governed by federal decisions.39
Appellees recite a revisionist record to belie the straightforward application of
Wier40 Wier held that:
• The railroad could have insisted that its employees be transported in vans with rear
seat head restraints simply by listing headrests as a mandatory safety feature in its
agreement with the van company;41 and
•

Whether the railroad should have taken such steps is a material issue of fact
sufficient to defeat the railroad's motion for summary judgment.42

35

Appellees' Brief, p. 28.
Id.
37
Appellees cite several cases not used in their motion for summary judgment.
38
Appellees' Brief p. 28.
39
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174 (1949); New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244
U.S. 147, 150(1917).
40
Appellees Brief, pp. 28-30.
41
Wier v. Soo Line RR Co., 1998 WL 474098 at *4 (N.D. 111.).
42
Id.
36

7

Appellees duck UP's agreement with Armadillo and its list of mandatory safety
equipment for Armadillo vehicles transporting UP employees.43 Appellees do not even
address the agreement, and tacitly concede that UP should have listed rear seat head
restraints as a mandatory safety feature in the agreement.44 Like Wier, whether UP
should have taken such steps, is a material issue of fact sufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgment.
F.

Mortensen is analogous - the same arguments asserted by Appellees were
rejected in Mortensen.
Appellees misunderstand Mortensen to the extent that they attempt to distinguish

it by using the very arguments rejected in that case.
The railroad in Mortensen argued that:

Appellees argue that:

Because manufacturers were not required
to install seat belts in California, the
railroad had no duty to install them.46
Because bus and taxicab companies had not
installed seatbelts, the railroad had no duty
to install them.48

Because manufacturers are not required to
install rear seat head restraints, UP has no
duty to require them.47
Because there is no evidence on the record
that other railroads require their employees
to be transported with rear seat head
restraints, UP has no duty to require them.49 |

43

Appellant's Brief, p. 32; R. 226 and 230.
Appellant's Brief, pp. 31-33; UP admits that it could have required rear seat head
restraints in its agreement with Armadillo. R. 893.
45
Appellees' Brief, p. 30-31.
46
Mortensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 245 Cal.App.2d 241, 244 (1966).
47
Appellees' Brief, pp. 3 0-31.
4i
Id.
49
Id.
44

Mortens en rejected Appellees' arguments and held that FELA liability attaches if
UP knew, or in the exercise of due care should have known, "that prevalent standards of
conduct were inadequate to protect its employees.5'50
G.

Appellees are not consumers - UP is a FELA employer and Armadillo is a
common carrier.
Appellees argue that: 1) they are consumers; and 2) that there is no difference

between them and the general public.51 Contrary to Appellees' arguments, UP is a FELA
employer and Armadillo is a common carrier, and - by definition - there is a significant
difference between them and the general public: UP is held to a non-delegable and
continuing duty to provide its employees with a reasonably safe workplace52 and
Armadillo is held to a higher standard of care than the reasonably prudent person
standard (a meticulous regard for possibilities which should ordinarily be ignored by the
general public).53
Appellees assert that imposing a duty on UP and Armadillo here, will "open the
floodgates" to claims against consumers and automobile dealerships.54 Applying the
facts of this case to the already existing FELA and common carrier duties will not open
any floodgate. In fact, Wier was decided in 1998 and Mortensen in 1966 and there has
been no flood. UP's FELA duty and Armadillo's common carrier duty do not apply to

50

Mortensen, 245 Cal.App. at 244; quoting, Urie, 337 U.S. at 178.
Appellees' Brief, pp. 2 7 and 31-32.
52
Peyton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 962 F.2d 832, 833 (8th Cir. 1992); Ragsdellv.
Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 688 F.2d 1282, 1283 (9th Cir. 1982).
53
Lamb v. B&B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 930 (Utah 1993); Johnson v.
Lewis, 240 P.2d 498, 502 (Utah 1952).
54
Appellees' Brief p. 32.
51

9

the general public, consumers, or automobile dealerships, and a decision pertaining to
Appellees will not affect these groups.
H.

The doctrine of conflict preemption is inapplicable.
Appellees misapply and misunderstand Geier and the doctrine of conflict

preemption.55 An "actual conflict" between state and federal law is required for the
doctrine of conflict to preemption to apply.56

As conceded by Appellees, "conflict

preemption occurs 'where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state
and federal requirements, ... or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'"57
The doctrine of conflict preemption and Geier do not apply for four reasons:
•

No installation. Archer does not claim that Appellees should have installed rear
seat head restraints. Archer claims that they should have used one of its many
vehicles already equipped with rear seat head restraints. MVSA/FMVSS is about
the manufacturers' installation of head restraints.

•

No state obstacle. This case presents two federal regulations (MVSA/FMVSS)
and a 100 year old federal law (FELA). Appellees argue that the state law at
conflict here is this Court's future ruling in this case. This reasoning is flawed
for at least two reasons: One, this case involves a FELA duty, based entirely on
federal law, not state law. Two, for conflict preemption to apply, it must be
impossible to comply with both a state and federal requirement - that is, there
must already be a state requirement in place that stands as an obstacle. This
Court's own decision cannot be used as an obstacle to its own decision. The
absurdity of this concept illustrates Appellees misunderstanding of the doctrine of
conflict preemption.

55

Appellees' Brief, pp. 33-39; Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861
(2000).
56
English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); See also, Louisiana Public .
Service Com'n v. F.C.C, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986). (Emphasis added).
51
Appellees' Brief at p. 33; English, 496 U.S. at 79; quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941). (Emphasis added).
58
Appellees' Brief, pp. 38-39.
10

•

Manufacturers,
MVSA and FMVSS apply exclusively to automobile
59
manufacturers. Archer is not suing an automobile manufacturer. This is a FELA
case involving a railroad employer and a common carrier.

•

Optional. Rear seat head restraints are not prohibited - they are optional for
automobile manufacturers.60 Thus, even if automobile manufacturer standards
applied in this case, there would be no actual conflict. MVSA/FMVSS optional
regulations do not stand as an obstacle to UP's FELA duty and Armadillo's
common carrier duty.

•

Minimum. MVSA and FMVSS impose minimum standards for automobile
manufacturers and the MVSA specifically provides that a state may prescribe
higher standards.61
Appellees cite Ray

for the improper assertion that because rear seat head

restraints are optional under the NHSTA, this preempts Archer's FELA claim.63 In Ray,
a Washington state law that banned oil tankers in excess of 125,000 DWT was preempted
by a federal law that did not ban oil tankers in excess of 125,000 DWT - the federal law
stated that a state may not impose higher standards than those prescribed by the federal
law.64 Ray is distinguishable for two reasons: 1) Unlike Ray, there is no state law in
conflict; 2) Unlike Ray - where the federal law explicitly disallowed states to impose

59

See, Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 889 F.Supp. 451 (W.D.Okl. 1995); Garden v.
General Motors Corp., 509 F.3d 227, 229-230 (5rf Cir. 2007); Urie, 337 U.S. at 181;
Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1943); Peyton, 962 F.2d at 833;
Ragsdell, 688 F.2d at 1283.
60
49 CFR §§ 571.202 and 571.202a.
61
The FMVSS is "a minimum standard for motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment
performance." 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e); MVSA, 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b) provides that "... a
State may prescribe a standard for a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment obtained
for its own use that imposes a higher performance requirement than that required by the
otherwise applicable standard under this chapter."
62
Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co. 435 U.S. 151 (1978)
63
Appellees' Brief p. 3 7.
64
Ray, 435 U.S. at 174-78.

higher standards - MVSA/FMVSS specifically provides that a state may prescribe higher
standards.65
I.

Issue "D" - the doctors5 expertise - was one of the grounds for the district
court's order granting summary judgment and should be reviewed for
correctness.
Issue "D" on appeal is whether a medical doctor has the medical expertise to

render medical causation opinions regarding injuries caused by the failure to provide rear
seat head restraints in a rear end collision.66 Appellees argue that this should be reviewed
by the abuse of discretion standard because it was not a grant of summary judgment, but
en

an evidentiary ruling.

Contrary to Appellees' argument, the district court's ruling on

the doctors' expertise was an element of the summary judgment order - the Order states:
Even if Armadillo and/or Union Pacific owed Plaintiff a duty, and
Plaintiffs claims were not barred by the doctrine of conflict preemption,
Plaintiff is unable to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff
would not have suffered his injuries if there had been rear seat head
restraints installed in the subject van. Indeed, Plaintiffs experts are
unable to offer any opinions as to whether the existence of a rear seat
head restraint would have prevented the Plaintiffs injuries.68
Archer appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment, including its
ruling on the doctors' competence to testify. This district court's summary judgment
order, which is the basis of Archer's appeal, should be reviewed for correctness, giving

65

49 U.S.C. § 30103(e); 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b).
Appellant's Brief, p. 9.
67
Appellees' Brief p. 20.
68
R. 1605-1609. (Emphasis added); See, Amended Order Granting Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment, Appellant Brief Addendum No. 10. (Emphasis added).
66
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the district court's legal decision no deference.

When ruling on a motion for summary

judgment, the district court must make many evidentiary decisions - what is relevant,
what is material, etc. If this meant that summary judgment rulings were reviewed by the
abuse of discretion standard, no case would be reviewed for correctness.
The Utah Supreme Court explained that "as a matter of the sound administration
of justice" the choice of the appropriate standard of review turns on whether the appellate
court or the trial court is in a better position to decide the issue.

The U.S. Supreme

Court stated that when the issue involves the credibility of witnesses and turns on an
71

evaluation of demeanor, the trial court is in a better position to decide the issue.

Courts

of appeals, on the other hand, are able to devote their primary attention to legal issues and
decisional accuracy, employing multi-judge panels that permit reflective dialogue and
79

collective judgment.
This is an appeal of the district court's grant of summary judgment. There was no
trial. There was no live testimony. The district court did not evaluate the doctors'
demeanor or credibility. The district court ruled as a matter of law that Archer's medical
doctors were unable to give medical causation opinions regarding injuries caused by the

69

See, Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Salt Lake County Commission, 28 P.3d 686, 688 (Utah
2001).
70
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993); quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 559-60 (1988).
71
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985).
72
Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1991).
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failure to provide rear seat head restraints in a rear end collision.73 The district court does
not have discretion to misapply the law.74
Appellees cite Carbaugh v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd.

for abuse of discretion review.

In Carbaugh, the issue regarding the admissibility of the doctor's testimony was found to
be both evidentiary and a question of law and the issue was reviewed for correctness the Court reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment and holding the doctor's
77

testimony admissible.
J.

In the alternative, the district court abused its discretion in a ruling that
exceeds the limits of reasonability - biomechanical experts testify to general
causation; medical doctors to specific causation.
The district court abused its discretion if the grant exceeds the limits of
no

reasonability.

The "limits of reasonability" standard is specific to each case with no
70

bright-line test.

The district court's summary judgment ruling - that Archer's experts

are unable to offer any opinions as to whether the existence of a rear seat head restraint
would have prevented Archer's injuries

~ exceeds the limits of reasonability.

73

R. 1605-1609; See, Amended Order Granting Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment, Appellant Brief Addendum No. 10.
74
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991); 5 Am. Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 772
(1962).
75
167 P.3d 1063 (Utah 2007).
76
Appellees Brief pp. land 20.
77
Carbaugh, 167 p.3d at 1065 and 1068.
78
Price Development Company v. Orem City, 995 P.2d 1237, 1242 (Utah 2000).
79
Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 192 P.3d 858, 865 (Utah 2008).
80
R. 1605-1609; See, Amended Order Granting Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment, Appellant Brief Addendum No. 10.
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Biomechanical experts are ordinarily not permitted to give opinions about the
"precise cause of a specific injury."81

Biomechanical experts may render opinions as to

general causation (the effect of the absence of a head restraint on the human body and the
types of injuries that may result), but not as to specific causation (whether the absence of
a head restraint caused Archer's injuries).

An opinion on specific causation "requires

the identification and diagnosis of a medical condition, which demands the expertise and
specialized training of a medical doctor."
Here, Archer's biomechanical expert Paul France Ph.D. rendered a general
causation opinion:
A properly designed and positioned seat head restraint prevents hyperextension of the cervical spine when used as intended, and would have
likely prevent Mr. Archer's neck from hyper-extending, if used in such a
manner. Preventing hyper-extension significantly reduces the frequency
and severity of cervical, upper thoracic, and upper shoulder injuries in the
general population.84
Dr. Huntsman rendered specific causation opinions - "it is my opinion that the
absence of a seat head restraint or head rest was very likely to be one of the medical
causes of the neck injury and cervical myelopathy which require surgical intervention."
Dr. Gordon rendered a specific causation opinion - when asked if it was his opinion that
the head restraint, or the lack of head restraint in this particular instance, was a causative

81

Bowers v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 537 F.Supp.2d 1343, 1377 (M.D.Ga. 2007) (FELA
case); quoting Smelser v. NorfolkS. Ry. Co., 105 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 1997) (FELA
case).
82
Bowers, 537 F.Supp.2d at 1377.
83
Id.
M
R.I549.
*5R. 842.
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factor with the shoulder injury, Dr. Gordon testified, "Yes. I think it contributed to it,
yes."86
Archer's experts stayed within their defined causation-opinion roles - Dr. France
opined as to general causation and Drs. Huntsman and Gordon opined as to specific
causation.

Appellees have it backwards - they argue that Archer's medical doctors

cannot give specific causation opinions - that this is the purview of Archer's
on

biomechanical expert, Dr. France.
roles of experts regarding causation.

This is in direct contradiction to the defined legal
It would have been improper under the law, for

Dr. France to give an opinion as to specific causation and identify and diagnose Archer's
medical condition. Drs. Huntsman and Gordon properly made this determination and the
district court abused its discretion in its ruling that they could not render such opinions.
K.

The record is replete with evidence of medical causation including deposition
testimony and evidence submitted by AppelleesAppellees blindly conclude, without citation, that "no expert can opine that

Plaintiff probably would not have suffered his injuries had there been a rear seat head
restraint installed."89 Appellees applied the wrong standards in their motion for summary
judgment and have applied the wrong standards on appeal. Citing MUJI 1st Civ. 209,
Appellees apply the wrong causation standard - "[fjor a jury to find for Plaintiff on the
issue of causation, it must find that the acts or failure to act by Defendants "produced
harm or set in motion events that produced the harm in a natural and continuous
86

R. 1493-1494.
Appellees' Brief, pp. 21 -23.
88
Bowers, 537 F.Supp.2d at 1377; quoting Smelser, 105 F.3d at 305.
9
* Appellees' Brief, p. 31.
87

sequence."

The FELA causation standard differs from common law proximate cause.

The terms "actual cause," "proximate cause," and "but for" have little or no meaning.92
The FELA standard is whether UP's negligence "played any part, even the slightest," in
causing Archer's5 injuries.9j
Appellees conceded medical causation by submitting the letters and depositions of
Drs. Huntsman and Gordon into the record supporting their motion for summary
judgment. In defendants' summary judgment exhibit "O," Dr. Huntsman stated, "it is my
opinion that the absence of a seat head restraint or head rest was very likely to be one of
the medical causes of the neck injury and cervical myelopathy which require surgical
intervention."94

Drs. Huntsman and Gordon also testified at deposition to medical

causation, as explained in Appellant's Brief.95
L.

The doctors are qualified to render medical causation opinions in this case.
Drs. Huntsman and Gordon are orthopedic surgeons, specializing in spine injury

and surgery, and were Archer's treating physicians.96 Dr. Huntsman explained that the
mechanism of injury in this case was hyper-extension of the neck (whiplash).

To

exclude the opinions of Drs. Huntsman and Gordon means that the diagnosis and medical
causation of whiplash injuries are outside the expertise of spine surgeons.

90

Appellees'Brief, pp. 17-18.
Oglesby v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 6 F.3d 603, 607 (9th Cir. 1993).
92
Crane vs. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Railroad Company, 395 U.S. 164, 165 (1969).
93
Rogers v. MissouriPac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1956); Oglesby 6 F.3d at 606.
94
R. 842. (Emphasis added).
95
Appellant's Brief pp. 46-47.
96
R. 896, 1493-94, 1539.
97
R. 896.
91
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The idea that seat head restraints prevent whiplash neck injuries is not novel or
controversial. MVSA/FMVSS states that the purpose of seat head restraints is to reduce
neck injuries.98 UP admits that seat head restraints reduce neck injuries." The NHSTA
and Dr. France found that seat head restraints prevent hyper-extension of the neck.100 Dr.
Huntsman testified that a barrier behind the neck (head restraint) prevents the neck from
excessive extension.101
Appellees cite Keener

for the improper proposition that orthopedic and spine

surgeons Drs. Huntsman and Gordon do not have the expertise to render medical
causation opinions regarding the injuries caused by the failure to provide a rear seat head
restraint.103 Keener is distinguishable for two reasons:
•

The plaintiff in Keener sought to qualify a medical doctor as a biomechanical
expert.104 Unlike Keener, Archer is not attempting to qualify a medical doctor as a
biomechanical expert. Dr. France is Archer's biomechanical expert. Drs.
Huntsman and Gordon are orthopedic and spine surgeons and Archer's treating
physicians.

•

The doctor in Keener was unqualified because he lacked experience in spinal
injuries and motor vehicle accidents105 — he practiced in the fields of
ophthalmology (medical management of diseases in the eye) and pathology (study
of health and disease).106 Unlike Keener, Drs. Huntsman and Gordon are medical
doctors specializing in orthopedic and spine surgery and have the medical
expertise to render medical/specific causation opinions in this case involving neck,
spine, and shoulder injuries.

98

49CFR§ 571.202.
R. 893.
100
R. 891, 892, 896, 905, 996, 1343-46.
m
R. 1492.
102
Keener v. Mid-Continent Cas., 817 So.2d 347 (La.App. 2002).
103
Appellees' Brief, p. 23.
104
Keener, 817 So.2d at 351.
105
M a t 353.
106
Id at 351.
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M.

Appellees misrepresent the opinions of Dr. France and the NIfSTA,
Contrary to Appellees misrepresentations,""" i ii I'lance \utui III.II ,i, iiopnly

designed and positioned jscal head leMi.unl ptrvrnw hyper-extension of the cervical spine
• uid would have likely prevented Archer's neck from, hyperextending, if used in MM Ii a manner.
Archer stated that if the w •
• >L'al liunf icstiiiinl lui I.

. .. , .

-

ie of his injury had a

I. i : *<• he would have leaned back in the seat and looked

forward, with his arms down,11)9 Archer stated that before tlic impjLL ;.. ..i UL
he had time to change his position an
advantage ui .-, ^

- - •

l

• >

i one existed.1

%

himself to take

It was Archer's custom i<- adii.^1

seat head,, restraints before this collision, and he certainly would have followed any safety
rule promulgated by the I IP requiring suui t.djuMinc.K:,.

[l

Appellees argil inn ii uiMhlm," ihr NIIS'IA height requirements for head restraints
i>, tuitMiiti fir snipe of the order on appeal " and Appellees failed to cross-appea1 v-n „.\*.
issue.113 Nevertheless, it is a red herring - ..^
requirements were msuiiicicnl lo prcvenl n p i i \ m

J.
,• NHSTA stated that the new

107

Appellees' Brief, pp. 17 and 22.
R.1549.
m
R. 895.
110
Id.
111
R 896.
112
R, 1605-iou)/, ^ee, Amended Order Granting Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment, Appellant Brief Addendum No. 10.
1,3
Appellees' Brief p. 17.
114
Id.
m
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height requirements would be more effective to limit the movement of the head and
neck.115
N.

Appellees misrepresent Johnson - Armadillo is held to a higher standard of
care.
Appellees only devote one paragraph to Armadillo and its higher standard of

care,116 in which they misrepresent Johnson by utilizing a partial quote117 - "the method
of determining whether a carrier has fulfilled that duty 'in both cases is the care of an
ordinary, prudent person under the existing facts and circumstances ,.." 118 The full quote
compares the carrier's duty to passengers for hire as opposed to the carrier's duty to
guests and the general public:
Although the test in both cases is the care of an ordinary, prudent person
under the existing facts and circumstances, the relationship of carrier to
its passengers for hire is a circumstance which requires more foresight
and greater caution than it owes to guests or the public generally.119
Armadillo's duty should not be measured by ordinary standards - "the law
imposes on [it] a meticulous regard for possibilities which should ordinarily be
ignored."120
Appellees contend that no duty exists because there is no requirement for
Armadillo to redesign its vehicles or install equipment.

Archer is not arguing that

Armadillo should have redesigned its vehicles or install equipment. Armadillo should
115

R. 706.
Appellees' Brief, p. 25.
ul
Id.
m
Id.
119
Johnson v. Lewis, 240 P.2d 498, 502 (Utah 1952).
120
Johnson, 240 P.2d at 502. (brackets added).
121
Appellees' Brief, p. 25.
116

on

have used one of its many vehicles already equipped by the manufacturers with rear seat
head restraints.
I .

i 'OIMC'LUSION

The right to a jury trial is part and parcel of the remedy ;iHorded to railroad
workers under the FELA. The district court and Appellees misapplied, misinterpreted,
and misunderstood the law - and the right to a jury trial was taken from Archer. Archer
asks the Court to reverse the district court's ruling.
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